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Abstract 
This paper considers the trade-off between growth and redistri-
bution policies in a two-country world with endogenous growth, 
tax competition, perfect capital mobility and extreme investment 
behaviour, two classes in each country and governments having 
opposing political preferences. It is shown that higher or lower 
growth when governments redistribute depends on their oppo-
nents when setting ta.xes. We find that the growth redistribution 
trade-off problem hinges on technological efficiency. If countries 
are equally efficient, no redistribution takes place, not even by 
two left-wing governments, for fear of capital flight. We show 
that redistribution is possible with a high growth rate as long as 
an efficiency gap can be maintained. This leads to capital flight 
for the inefficient country. 
*I would like to thank Rob Aalbers, Tony Atkinson, Berthold Herrendorf, Akos 
Valentinyi and Robert Waldmann for helpful discussions and co=ents. Of course, 
all errors are my own. 
t CorreBpondence: European University Institute, Badia Fiesolana, I-50016 San 
Domenico di Fiesole (FI), Italy. e-mail: rehme@dataco=.iue.it. 
1 Introduction 
This paper considers the trade-off between growth and redistribution 
policies in a two-country world with tax competition and perfect capital 
mobility. It extends the results of Rehme (1994b) by introducing the 
possibility of countries experiencing capital flight. 
In many policy discussions that address the issue of growth vs. re-
distribution, setting higher taxes for redistributive purposes is deemed to 
slow growth. Yet most developed and some developing countries redis-
tribute a significant share of their GNP. Does this always lead to lower 
growth? In the model developed in this paper it is argued that the expe-
rience of lower or higher growth when governments opt for redistribution 
depends on who their opponents are when setting taxes. In particular, 
it is shown that the growth redistribution trade-off problem depends on 
technological parameters, especially technological efficiency. Thus, the 
paper presents a model that reflects some aspects of cunent policy de-
bates, which identify on the one hand redistribution and high growth 
with securing high technological efficiency or international competitive-
ness and the possibility of experiencing drastic capital outflows as has 
been the case in some LDC countries in the 80's on the other. 
The model framework follows Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990) who 
study the impact of government spending on the private return on capital 
in growing economies using an endogenous growth set-up. Their results 
suggest that the government has room to stabilize the private return on 
capital and through this the growth rate. Recently, there have been some 
contributions that investigate the trade-off between growth and redistri-
bution using endogenous growth models. 
Alesina and Rodrik (1991) have analyzed how a benevolent govern-
ment in a Closed Economy with wealth taxes might solve this problem. 
They show that a government that cares about the non-accumulated 
factor of production (e.g. labour) experiences slower growth if it re-
distributes. capital (wealth) or capital income taxation leads to slower 
growth if a government redistributes to the non-accumulated factor, e.g. 
labour. This vein of research would suggest that the room for redistri-
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bution in terms of growth is very limited for governments that wish to 
or are compelled to pursue redistributive policies. 
The present paper extends the growth redistribution trade-off prob-
lem as formulated in Alesina and Rodrik (1991), (1994) to a two-country 
world. Capital is assumed perfectly mobile across countries. Govern-
ments in each country are assumed to be of two types. They can be 
either 'right-wing' and only care about the owners of the accumulated 
factor of production, i.e. capital, or they can be 'left-wing' caring about 
the welfare of the owners of the non-accumulated factor of production, i.e. 
labour. Thus, each country is assumed to consist of two classes, namely 
'Capitalists' and 'Workers'. To formulate the model in these terms serves 
to keep matters simple and allows one to concentrate on the problem of 
growth and redistribution. The Capitalists make the decision where to 
invest. It is shown that this decision optimally depends on the after-tax 
returns in the various countries in an extreme way. The investors imme-
diately shift their entire capital to the country where the return to their 
investment is higher. This simple framework allows one to analyze the 
effect of capital flight on growth and redistribution. 
In order to fix ideas and in line with most of the literature on capital 
taxation we will abstract from taxation of the non-accumulated factor of 
production (labour). This facilitates the analysis and permits focusing 
on the problems associated with taxing capital. 
The governments in each country (domestic and foreign) have to 
solve the trade-off problem by determining taxes and redistribution non-
cooperatively.1 
For open economies the following tax principle for e.g. capital in-
come taxation as tax rules are common:2 
1 For a model that studies the related problem of solving the trade-off between the 
provision of government consumption goods and growth in a Barro (1990) world see 
Devereux and Mansoorian (1992). 
2 Razin and Yuen (1992) use an endogenous growth set-up in order to show that 
the residence principle is Ramsey efficient. This result seems to suffer from a time 
inconsistency problem since distortionary capital or wage taxation may produce time 
inconsistent solutions. [Cf. Fischer (1980), Charnley (1985).] Capital taxation in 
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Under the 'Residence Principle' residents are taxed uniformly 
on their worldwide income regardless of the source of income 
(domestic or foreign), while non-residents are not taxed on 
income originating in the country. 
Under the 'Source Principle' all types of income originating 
in a country are taxed uniformly, regardless of the place of 
residence of the income recipients. 
It is shown that capital is good for left and right-wing countries. 
Thus, if a country loses capital it will suffer in terms of utility or some 
other objective criterion. 
If a country is exposed to the danger of capital flight, the source 
principle appears more suited as a tax principle, since the governments 
in a non-cooperative environment cannot perfectly monitor their resi-
dents' income or wealth. Therefore, in this paper a variant of the source 
principle is adopted, since we will allow for non-uniform tax rates. 
First, it is assumed that taxes are levied on wealth, that is, capital 
instead of capital income3 • Governments of otherwise identical economies 
compete for capital by setting tax rates and a redistribution parameter.4 
Given the capital the governments would like to pursue their preferred 
growth and distribution policies. 
For countries that are technologically similar, i.e. are equally ef-
ficient it is shown that in the Nash Equilibrium of the tax competition 
economies with high capital mobility has received quite some attention recently in 
e.g. Charnley (1992), Canzonieri (1989), Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Gosh 
(1991) and Devereux and Shi (1991). 
3The choice of tax base is not at all innocuous. As has been pointed out by 
Bertola (1991), (1993) and Alesina and Rodrik (1994) indirect taxation may lead to 
very different results as regards the growth redistribution trade-off. Capital income 
taxation cum equal investment tax subsidy e.g. is equivalent to a tax on consumption. 
This tax policy may then guarantee higher growth for left-wing governments .than 
right-wing ones as is shown in Rehme (1994a). 
4 Competition for capital has recently been studied by e.g. Sinn (1993). 
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game there is optimally no room for redistribution, even for two egali-
tarian governments. Thus, the model would predict that even left-wing 
governments who face an equally efficient opponent will not redistribute. 
The intuition behind this result is the following: Suppose given the 
same capital stock or the same investment quota in a right and a left-
wing country the left-wing country derives higher utility from being able 
to redistribute. For redistribution the left-wing government has to set 
higher taxes in this model. Higher taxes in turn imply lower investment 
given the same gross return to capital. This induces capital flight. The 
resulting decrease in utility is so high that a left-wing government is 
better off if it does not redistribute. Compensation is given by stopping 
the capital outflow and securing higher wages, which in an endogenous 
growth model increase with growing capital. Since the probability of 
finding two identically equally efficient countries is very small this result 
provides a benchmark for the following case. 
If countries differ in terms of technological efficiency it is shown that 
in the Nash Equilibrium the efficient country is always able to guarantee a 
higher after-tax return on capital. Thus, an efficient country will always 
find more capital invested in its economy than an inefficient one. This 
result seems to correspond to empirical observation. The question is 
whether the efficient country chooses a wealth tax proffie that allows for 
some redistribution. The answer is yes. An efficient left-wing government 
is able to undertake some redistribution. The amount of redistribution 
is limited by the tax choices of its opponent and its efficiency advantage. 
With the extreme behaviour of the worldwide investors the inefficient 
country will then experience capital flight. 
From this one may conclude that redistribution may go together 
with a higher growth rate than that of one's opponent as long as the 
efficiency gap can be maintained. Interestingly and in contrast to Rehme 
(1994b) it is argued that a redistributing government of an efficient econ-
omy is better off when capital is perfectly mobile. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model 
set-up, derives the equilibrium in a Closed Economy and briefly presents 
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the optimal policy choices as have been put forth in Alesina and Rodrik 
(1991). Section 3 formulates a dynamic game where the governments 
with opposing political objectives compete for capital by setting wealth 
tax rates. In two propositions the main results of this paper are stated. 
Section 4 concludes. Proofs of the propositions made in Section 3 can be 
found in the Appendix. 
2 The Model 
Consider a Two-Country World with a "domestic" and a "foreign" coun-
try. Let us denote variables in the foreign country by a(*). There are two 
kinds of many identical individuals in each country, those who own capi-
tal and no labour and those who own labour, but no capital. Let us call 
the latter Workers and the former Capitalists. Workers and Capitalists 
are assumed to have the following simple logarithmic utility functions5: 
U(C;) = ln Cf, i = W,k (1) 
Hence, both agents derive utility from the consumption of a homoge-
neous, malleable good that is produced in the two countries. This as-
sumes that foreign and domestic output, Yi and~* are perfect substitutes 
in consumption. 
Those who own capital, own shares of two representative firms. A 
firm is assumed a production unit only. It takes the following important 
form: 
(3) 
where Yi is output produced in the home country, Kt the overall domesti-
cally installed real capital stock, kt (k;) is thereal capital stock owned by 
5This specification is adopted for analytical convenience. The model can be ex-
tended to more general classes of utility functions without altering the results. 
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domestic (foreign) Capitalists, Gt are public mputs to production and A 
is an efficiency parameter, which is assumed constant over time·. We will 
set Lt = 1, so that labour is supplied inelastically over time. Throughout 
the analysis we will abstract from problems arising from depreciation. 
Unless stated otherwise it is assumed that A :=:;; A* so that both 
countries are equally efficient. I will call· these economies similar. If 
this does not hold, I will refer to the countries as being different. The 
variable Wt E [0, 1] where w E IR1 denotes the fraction of real capital at 
date t owned by domestic Capitalists invested in the home country. The 
fraction 1 Wt is invested abroad by the domestic Capitalists. Similar 
reasoning applies to the foreign Capitalists.6 
Note that we assume that foreign and domestic capital are substi-
tutes. This abstracts from the possibility that e.g. foreign capital may 
be a necessary input for domestic production. As it is the aim of this pa-
per to model competition for capital, assuming complementarity would 
only exacerbate the competition, but would not change the results of this 
paper in any fundamental way. 
From now on the subscript t will be dropped whenever it is clear 
that the variables in question and the ones derived from them depend on 
time. 
This form of a production function has been introduced by Barro 
(1990). We may note that in the absence of a government a Closed 
Economy breaks down and the Workers and the Capitalists starve. 
2.1 The Public Sector 
The governments in both countries choose to tax wealth. Let t 1 be the 
tax rate on real capital (wealth) which is held domestically by domestic 
investors. Thus, t 1 is levied on wk. The government also taxes real 
6Note that this formulation allows for the case that all of the domestically owned 
capital is invested abroad. This serves to bring out the effect of capital flight more 
clearly. Alternatively we could have assumed that w E [q, 1] where q is a- possibly-
small number. The results of the paper would not change in any significant way. 
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foreign capital invested in the home country, i.e. {1- w*)k*. Denote the 
tax rate on this by t2 • Analogous definitions hold for the foreign country. 
This way of taxing wealth means that the countries adopt a variant of 
the Source Principle as a tax rule. 
The Source Principle implies that all types of wealth present in a 
country are taxed uniformly, regardless of the place of residence of the 
owners of wealth. 
If capital is internationally mobile it makes sense to adopt this 
principle since governments in a non-cooperative environment cannot 
perfectly monitor their residents' wealth. At this stage we still allow for 
non-uniform tax rates which the principle rules out in order to concen-
trate on the instruments that are at the governments' disposal. 
Let us define r as the average tax rate levied on the overall installed 
capital stock in the economy. Given the Barro-type production function 
we can then define the following government budget constraint, which is 
assumed to be balanced at each point in time: 
rK=G+>.rK. {4) 
The LHS depicts the tax revenues and the RHS public expenditures. 
The Workers receive >.rk as transfers and G is spent on public inputs to 
production.7 
Rearranging and taking into account that the domestic government 
may have two sources of tax revenues we contemplate the following bud-
get constraint: 
G = {1 - >.)[t1wk + t 2(1- w*)k*] = (1- >.)r J(. (5) 
Underlying this is our earlier definition of the average tax rate T. 
Using (5) and (3) the average tax rate then amounts to the following 
7Note that T(l- >.) = GjK so that T = T(K(k, k*)). Also, Y is homogeneous of 
degree 1 in k and k* so that T is homogeneous of degree 0 in k and k*. Thus if K 
increases by some factor ¢, T will remain constant so that r will remain constant as 
well. 
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expression: . 
(6) 
Thus, the average tax rate depends on six variables, namely it, i2, 
w, w*, k and k*. The only variables under the direct discretion of the 
government in the determination of rare it and i 2 • We may note that r 
is set by the government independently of other factors in the economy 
if it chooses i 1 = i 2 = r which corresponds to the uniform taxation of 
wealth as required by the Source Principle. 
2.2 Property Structure and Firms 
There are many identical firms in each country which operate in a per-
fectly competitive environment. A representative .firm is assumed to be 
a profit maximizer. The firms are owned by domestic and foreign capital 
owners. Foreign and domestic Capitalists rent capital to and demand 
shares of the representative domestic firm. The same holds for the for-
eign firm. The domestic Capitalists' assets are their shares of the two 
representative firms. The shares of the two firms are collateralized one-
to-one by physical capital. The markets for assets and physical capital 
are assumed to clear at each point in time so that the representative do-
mestic firm faces a path of a uniform, market clearing rental rate, {rt}, 
of domestically installable capital, K. 
Given perfect competition the firms in the domestic economy rent 
capital and hire labour in spot market in each period in their country. 
We assume that foreign and domestic output are perfect substitutes and 
set the price of Y and Y* equal to 1. Given constant returns to capital 
and labour, factor payments exhaust output. Profit maximization then 
entails that firms pay each factor of production its marginal product 
r = 8Yj8]{ = aA[(l- >.)r]t-a, (7) 
w = 8Yj8K := 1l(r,>.)K = (1- a)A[(l >.)r]l-"'K, L = 1. (8) 
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Note that (7) implies that there is an intra-country arbitrage at 
work which makes the return on foreign and domestic capital installed 
in each firm equal in the domestic country. The same, of course, applies 
to the foreign country. 
We see that the average tax rate has a bearing on the marginal 
product of capital which is set equal to the rental rate of capital, i.e. the 
rate of return for the Capitalists, by the firms if the capital market is in 
equilibrium. 
We may now consider how the rate of return and wages are affected 
by changes in government parameters and capital composition. 
Let us use the definitions given in (3), (5), and (6), and assume 
0 < w ::; 1, 0 ::; w* < 1 and fixed for the home country. Then 
or wk 
ot
1 
= o{1- o:)A((1- >.)Tt"'(1- >.) J( > 0, (9a) 
:~ = o:(1- o:)A((1- .\)Tj-"'(1 >.) (1 - ;*)k* > 0, (9b) 
~~ o:(1 - o:)A((1 - A)Tj-"'( -T) < 0. (9c) 
So redistribution has a negative effect on the interest rate and in-
creases in the tax rates raise the rate of return. 
Defining .6.. = o:(1-o:)A[·]-"'(1->.) we get a rather more ambiguous 
picture for capital flows 
(10) 
Thus the effect of more domestic capital on the interest rate depends on 
government parameters. Equivalently, for k* we get 
or = .6.. [(t2- tl)w(1 - w*)k] > 0 if 2. 
ok* J<2 < t2<tl. (11) 
The equations (10) and (11) capture the fact that the capital that flows 
into the country should be taxed more heavily ceteris paribus since it 
provides the basis for more public inputs to production. 
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For the wages we obtain the following relationships that are easy 
to verify 
1/tl > 0, 7Jt2 > 0, 7]>. < 0 . (12) 
Thus for fixed w, w* increases in t1 or t2 lead to positive changes in 
the rate of return and in wages. Redistribution lowers each of them.8 
2.3 Capitalists 
There are many identical Capitalists in each country, who cannot move, 
and choose how much of their income they consume or invest. Each 
individual Capitalist has to take prices such as r as given. 
Since they have the opportunity to invest in either country they 
have to determine where their investment is to take place, w. We will 
assume that it is costless to send and install capital abroad so that perfect 
capital mobility between the countries prevails. This assumption may be 
justified by the fact that we have assumed that physical capital is entirely 
collateralized by stocks that are traded. Then perfect capital mobility 
amounts to a situation where the world capital market is taken to be fully 
integrated, which for some countries and assets seems to be a reasonable 
approximation of reality.9 
A representative Capitalist is assumed to have perfect foresight as 
the the price and tax rate paths and maximizes his/her intertemporal 
utility according to the following programme taking prices and tax rates 
8 As argued in e.g. Razin and Sadka (1994) or Bovenberg (1994) the Source Prin-
ciple entails a uniform taxation of residents' and foreigners' capital income. In this 
paper this condition is not imposed and the derivatives above prove crucial in the tax 
competition game we will concern ourselves with below. 
9The alternative case of costly capital transfers is dealt with in Rehme (1994b ). 
The assumption of perfect capital mobility allows one to concentrate on the issue of 
capital flight, which we will do in this paper. 
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as given. 
00 
max j U(Ck) e-ptdt (13) 
Ckw 
' 0 
s.t. k = (r- tl)wk + (r*- t;)(l- w)k- ck' (14) 
0 ~ w ~ 1' (15) 
k(O) = k, k( oo) =free. (16) 
In (14) we reflect the fact that the representative Capitalist has to 
take r and r* as given since we assumed earlier on that the asset and 
capital markets clear at all times. Equation (14) is the dynamic budget 
constraint of the representative Capitalist. Note that the Capitalists are 
assumed to earn income at home, rwk, and abroad, r*(1- w)k. 
The necessary first order conditions for this problem are given by 
(14), (15), (16) and the following equations: 
U' - p. = 0 (17a) 
p.(r- ti)k p.(r*- t2)k = 0 (17b) 
jL = p.p- p. [(r- t1)w + (r*- t;)(1 w)] (17c) 
lim kp.e-pt =b. {17d) 
t-oo 
where p. is a positive co-state variable which can be interpreted as 
the instantaneous shadow price of one more unit of investment at date t. 
Equation (17a) equates the marginal utility of consumption to the shadow 
price of more investment, (17c} is the standard Euler equation which 
relates the costs of foregone investment (LHS) to the discounted gain in 
marginal utility (RHS), noting U' = p., and (17d) is the transversality 
condition for the capital stock which ensures that the capital stock does 
not grow without bound asymptotically. 
Equation {17b) describes the Capitalists' investment decision. This 
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takes a "bang-ban[/' form and so investment is given by:10• 
(r- t 1)- (r*- t~) > 0 
(r- t1) = (r* - t~) 
(r- t1) (r*- t~) < 0. 
(18) 
Thus, the Capitalists investment behaviour is extreme in that they im-
mediately shift their capital to the country where the after-tax return on 
capital is higher. This replicates the simplifying assumption that capital 
can costlessly be transferred to other countries. The simple formulation 
allows one to concentrate on the observation that international after-tax 
return differentials induce capital flows in the direction indicated above.11 
Then, depending on the after-tax returns in the two countries, we 
get a steady state growth rate of consumption which follows in a standard 
way from (17c) and (18): 
Case 1: w = 0: 
Case 2: wE [0,1]: 
Case 3: w = 1: 
'Y1 = (r* t2) - p 
'Y2 = (r- t1)w + (r*- t2)(1- w)- p (19) 
'Ya = (r- t1)- p. 
It follows that consumption of the Capitalists grows at a rate which 
depends on the after-tax returns in the two countries. Note that for Case 
1 the growth rate is completely determined by the after-tax return in the 
foreign country and all the domestic capital "bangs" into the foreign 
country. If w > 0, however, part of the domestic capital remains in 
the home country, but this implies that the after-tax returns in the two 
countries must be equal. Case 2 is of particular interest below. Note 
that we have allowed w to go where it would like if the after-tax returns 
are equal. Thus if the latter are equal we may well observe that all the 
capital of e.g. the home country bangs into the foreign country (Case 
1) or entirely remains at home (Case 3). In Case 3 all the growth takes 
place in the home country, if the after-tax return is higher there. This 
completely describes the behaviour of the Capitalists. 
1
°For a more detailed treatment of this form in intertemporal problems cf. e.g. 
Chiang (1992), Kamien and Schwartz (1991). 
11 For an example that physical capital may actually be transferred because of return 
differentials see Ruffin (1984). 
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2.4 Workers 
The Workers are assumed to derive a utility stream from consuming their 
wages. They do not invest and they are not taxed by assumption.12 Thus, 
their intertemporal utility is given by 
00 j U(Cw)e-6tdt where Cw =rJ(r,>..)K+>..ri<. (20) 
0 
This assumption is reminiscent of growth models such as: Kaldor 
(1956), where different proportions of profits and wages are saved. In the 
extreme case Capitalists save. and Workers do not, which is the "Clas-
sical Savings Rule", In Kaldorian models the Capitalists' investment 
decision is determined by the exogenously given growth rate. Recently, 
Bertola (1993) has derived the" Classical Savings Rule" result from utility 
ma.xi:mization, which endogenizes the investment decisions and therefore 
the growth rate. In that sense our set-up reflects this result. However, 
Bertola does not use a two class model and there are important differ-
ences to post-Keynesian models of growth, the most important of which 
is probably that the causality in both approaches is running in opposite 
directions. Whereas in Kaldorian models the growth rate determines the 
factor share incomes, in endogenous growth models the direction is rather 
from factor shares to the growth rate. 
2.5 Equilibrium 
2.5.1 Closed Economy 
In the Closed Economy w = 1, t1 = t 2 = T, J( = k. The agents take the 
parameters and the prices as given .. 
The overall resource constraint in our economy is: 
(21) 
12Negative values for >. would be tantamount to wage taxes or taxes on human 
capital. In order to focus on the effects of capital taxation we will abstract from any 
effects of wage taxes on our economies. 
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Since the Workers' consumption is cw = (17 + AT)k, Vt this constraint is 
binding. This simplifies (21) to 
(22) 
The Capitalists' consumption grows at 
(;k 
/ck = Ck = (r T)- p. (23) 
The rental rate, r, is given by (7) and is constant by (6), hence /Ck 
is constant. In steady state all variables are supposed to grow at the 
same constant rate. To verify that this is the case consider (2). Use the 
definition of G, that is, G = (1- >.)Tk, and substitute in (2). Recalling 
that Lt = 1 and taking logarithms and time derivatives yields /Y = /k· 
Now divide (22) by k. In steady state all variables must grow at a 
constant rate. Rearrange (22) to obtain 
/k- (r- T) =constant= -Ck jk. 
Taking logarithms and time derivatives yields /ck = /k· 
Hence, in steady state we have balanced growth with 
This describes the dynamic equilibrium of the Closed Economy. 
2.5.2 Two-Country World 
(24) 
In this section we will only make a few observations on the nature of 
the equilibrium in the presence of arbitrarily given tax rates. We can 
have the following situations for the domestic country: t1 > t2, t1 < t2 
or t 1 = t2 • Thus, we would have to go through six domestic vs. foreign 
tax rate configurations, noting that the levels of the tax rates have been 
unspecified and we have used symmetry. If we partition w E [0, 1] into 
w1 = 0, w2 E (0, 1), and wa = 1 and sinlliarly w*, and invoke symmetry 
we have six possible w, w* configurations. 
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The determination of w, w* is crucial for the description of the equi-
librium of the two-country world. Given the above possibilities one would 
have to go through 36 possible cases. Since w depends on max( r- t 1 , r*-
t2) in the way given by (18) and the level of the tax rates has been left 
unspecified it stands to reason that any w, w* can be sustained as a possi-
ble equilibrium. This is especially true if there are great differences in the 
levels. For instance if f > t 1 - t2 > ti t2 and since r, r* are increasing 
in tax rates then ( w = 1, w* = 0) so that capital flight occurs. 
I have tried to argue that almost all w, w* configurations can be 
sustained given arbitrary levels and combinations of the tax rates and 
conclude from the above that each w, w"' combination can be sustained 
by multiple tax rate combinations and that these combinations constitute 
an extremely large, possibly infinite space of possible equilibria. 
Economically, this suggests that we cannot say very interesting 
things about the economies unless we put more restrictions on the way 
taxes are set, which is the objective of the tax competition game we will 
contemplate below. 
2.6 The Government in a Closed Economy 
We will now look at a government that cares about the two groups in 
a closed economy. In this case our model reduces to one, where w = 1 
and t 1 = t2 = r. We will consider the domestic economy. Respecting 
the right of private property, it has to choose the paths of T and >.. in 
order to solve the following intertemporal problem, which is taken from 
the model of Alesina and Rodrik (1991): 
s.t. 
00 . 00 
max (1- f3) j1nck e-ptdt + f3jlncw e-8tdt (25) 
r,>. 
0 0 
ck = pk, 
cw = 1J(·)k + >..rk, 
k = 1(r,>..)k, 
>.. ~ 0. 
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(26) 
(27) 
(28) 
(29) 
For this we note that Ck = (r- r)k- k and 1 = (r- r)- p so that 
ck = pk. 
The parameter f3 E [0, 1] represents the welfare weight attached to 
the two groups in the economy. If f3 = 1, (0), the government cares about 
the Workers (Capitalists) only. I will refer to the government's choice of 
f3 as being a 
f3 = 1, (0) -left-wing (right-wing) government. 
Note that the condition A 2:: 0 restricts the governments in such a 
way that even a right-wing government does not tax workers. In that 
sense even a right-wing government is "nice" to the workers. A negative 
A would effectively amount to a tax on wages. 
Let us consider the case of equal discount rates, 8 = p. The solution 
to the government's problem is presented in Alesina and Rodrik (1991) 
and is given by: 
If f3 2:: =-[ ( 1_--'o: )_A-=-]11_"' 
8 
f = (38, 
then: 
If f3 < [(1 -1A]ll"' then: 
- · [(1- o:)A]ll"' 
A= 1- (38 
f[1- o:(1 - o:)Af-"'] = (38(1- o:), 
(30) 
(31) 
A right-wing government, f3 = 0, is only concerned about growth. The 
growth maximizing tax rate (A = 0) is 
f = [o:(1 - o:)A]11"'. (32) 
A left-wing government, f3 .= 1, cares about the Workers only: 
f = 8, ,\ = 1 - [(1 - ~)A]l/"' (33) 
From (32) and (33), we see that f > f when A 2:: 0 so that growth is not 
maximized. This becomes clearer from the following graph. 
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Figure 1: The relationship between 1 and T in a Closed Economy 
-y(r) 
T 
f T 
Parameter values: a= 1/2, p = 0, A= 2. 
At 7 the growth rate is maximal. If higher taxes are levied for 
redistribution then the growth rate decreases, i.e. growth is traded off 
against redistribution at a point such as f. 
To keep matters simple we will only look at the border cases of 
f3 = 1, and f3 = 0 in what is to follow. It can be seen from above that 
f3 is inversely related to the growth rate. Alesina and Rodrik (1991) 
derive some interesting results from the above. They analyze the effects 
of changes in A and, more interestingly for this paper, find that in the 
"high /3" region the tax rate will approach the growth maximizing one 
with >. = 0. They justify this by setting p < {; and argue that if the 
Capitalists are more patient the Social Planner arbitrages between the 
two groups' time preference with the effect that the growth rate starts 
out low but picks up over time. 
We will see that this result is not uninteresting for our analysis. In 
their footnote (3), though, they rul~ this out for the extreme cases f3 = 0, 
f3 = 1, which are of interest in tlii.s· paper. 
An interesting implication of the above is that there is a wide range 
of values where no redistribution takes place. Note that given non-
perverse coefficients of technology and if p = {; is a lot lower than /3, 
i.e. Capitalists and Workers are patient, then even a left-wing govern-
ment might not redistribute. 
However, if the Capitalists and the Workers are not sufficiently pa-
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tient, then a left-wing government seems to force a non-maximal growth 
rate on its economy. From this we get a rather gloomy picture for govern-
ments in terms of the growth rate that take the objective of redistribution 
"at heart". 
Finally, we may note that the optimal tax rates are non-zero. This is 
due to the assumption that >. is non-negative and labour supply inelastic. 
As has been shown by Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993a) and Jones, 
Manuelli and Rossi (1993b) and in contrast to e.g. Charnley (1986) this 
leads to non-zero tax rates on e.g. capital income. 
3 Tax Competition in a Two-Country 
World with Perfect Capital Mobility 
The question we shall pose ourselves in this section is: 
What happens to the optimal choices of tax rates and redistri-
bution parameters if these choices have to be made in a two-
country world with capital mobility and costly capital transfers 
and countries cannot coordinate their policies? 
This is a relevant question for countries where full tax harmoniza-
tion may not be possible. There is a possibility then that countries engage 
in tax competition.13 
We will look for a Nash Equilibrium of the game described below. 
The strategies of the two governments are the choices of ill t2,).. and 
ti, t2, ).*. Only pure strategies choices are considered.l4 
For the formulation of the game we have in mind we will employ 
the following 
13For a similar point cf. e.g. Bovenberg (1994). 
14Cf. e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). 
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Assumptions: 
1. There is no uncertainty. Perfect knowledge about all the parame-
ters, objective functions, the strategies and the sequence of moves 
prevails. 
2. All agents act non-cooperatively. 
3. The governments move simultaneously. 
4. The private sector, that is, the Workers and the Capitalists move 
simultaneously. 
5. The governments move before the private sector. 
6. At each point in time the agents are confronted with the same 
problem. 
7. Agents remember at t only what they have done at date 0. 
8. k0 = k~, i.e. both countries have the same initial capital stock. 
(Unless stated otherwise.) 
9. A = A*, i.e. the countries are equally efficient or similar. (Unless 
stated otherwise.) 
10. p = p*, i.e. the countries' rate of time preference is equal across 
countries. 
Assumption (5.) defines a game whose solution is called a Ramsey 
Equilibrium. This is similar to a Stackelberg Leadership Solution, where 
the governments are the Stackelbe~g leaders. Assumption (6.) defines 
a repeated game and (7.) means that the information structure is open-
loop.15 Also, if the Capitalists can invest in a global environment it makes 
sense to assume that they have the same rate of time preference. 
15The justification for assuming this information structure may lie in the fact that 
democratic governments of either political leaning may constantly be reminded of their 
pre-election promises so that the outcome of the game in the first stage provides a 
benchmark for their decisions at timet. If the gove=ents could remember the whole 
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3.1 The Government's Objective 
Denote the domestic and foreign government by IIi and IIi* where i = 
left (1), right (r), respectively. We will consider government objectives 
where each government would like to have as much capital in its country 
as possible and maximize its domestic objective function. It is shown 
that this is consistent with the objectives as put forth in the set-up of 
Alesina and Rodrik (1991). 
To see this note the following: The governments have to take the 
w1 s as given from the second stage of the game. For the argument to 
follow the only thing we need is that the investors take the price paths 
of rt, Wt and the taxes as given and then choose their optimal w1 s. Then 
the government goes through a comparative static thought exercise and 
indirectly chooses optimal w1 s through its choice of tax parameters. 
For what is to follow and to keep matters simple we will define 
capital flight as a situation where one country gets all the capital. For 
the domestic country this would amount to w = 1 and w* = 0 for instance. 
A change in the composition of the overall installed capital stock 
is given by df{ = w dk + (1 w*) dk*. Noting that k0 = k~ a small 
change in k or k* has a positive effect on J{ and this change depends on 
w, w*. Hence, for governments that prefer more capital to less policies 
affecting k or k* play an important role. Note that we have assumed that 
domestic and foreign capital are substitutes in production. For this we 
will contemplate governments that do not prefer domestic over foreign 
capital. 
From our earlier discussion we know that the Capitalists take r, r* 
as given and that firms pay each factor its marginal product, also taking 
prices as given. Thus, in a competitive situation the agents and the 
history of the game, time inconsistency issues would emerge. Modelling problems 
of time inconsistency and assuming appropriate trigger strategies for a closed loop 
information structure is beyond the scope of this paper. Thus it is implicitly assumed 
that governments commit themselves to their decisions. How this commitment is 
enforced is outside of this model. References for dynamic games are e.g. Petit (1990) 
and Basar and Olsder (1982). 
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firms do not take account of their effect on G. From the fact that the 
production function is constant returns to scale with respect K and L it 
follows that gross capital income is given by r J( = aY and gross wage 
income by wL = (1 a)Y. The effect of more capital, i.e. an increase in 
k or ink* on domestic output from the government's viewpoint is given 
by 
dY = Yk dk + Yk· dk* . (34) 
where Yk and Jlk. are the partial derivatives with respect to k and k* 
respectively, evaluated at the second stage equilibrium values of the w' s. 
These derivatives are given by 
Yk = [aAK"'-1G1-"' + (1- a)AK"'G-"'t1] w ::::: 0, (35a) 
Yk· = [aAK"'-1G1-"' + (1- a)AK"'G-"'t2] (1- w*)::::: 0. (35b) 
and are evaluated at L = 1 and the optimal w' s from the second stage 
of the game. It follows that dY :=:: 0. Thus, an increase ink and ink* 
raises domestic output. But it also raises the gross income of both types 
of agents, since 
d(rK) =a dY :=:: 0 and d(wL) = (1 a) dY :=:: 0. (36) 
So more capital in the domestic country leads to higher income. This in 
turn loosens the budget constraints of both Capitalists and Workers as 
can be seen from (14) and (20). 
This means that an increase in k and k* is in the interest of right-
wing and left-wing governments. For consistency with the objective func-
tions as put forth in section 2.6 all we require then are objective functions 
that are (a) continuous in tax parameters and increasing in (k, k*) given 
wand (1- w*). 
We know from the theory of optimal taxation that the government's 
problem can be stated in terms of the indirect utility function.16 
16Note that the welfare function is a function of the government's instruments and 
that this function need not necessarily coincide with the individual agents' utilities as 
noted in e.g. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1989), chpt.12 and Diamond and Mirrlees (1971 ). 
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Out of this class of objective functions we will consider the fol-
lowing welfare function for the domestic right-wing (r) and left-wing (1) 
government, II: 
i = l, r (37) 
where D = w + (1- w*) and w, w* are taken as given by the government. 
Vi has the following properties 3V/ for tilj = 1,2 and 
J 
(38) 
In Appendix A.l it is shown that (37) satisfies (a) and represents in 
a concise form the properties of the indirect utility functions of both the 
agents and the governments.17 Vi 2: 0 reflects the fact that only left-wing 
governments ((3 = 1) derive utility from redistribution. The condition on 
v; is assumed for consistency with the closed economy solution where we 
argued that there is an optimal tax rate f that insures maximum growth. 
For this notice that r = r(tb t2). 
We may note that (37) incorporates an important feature of com-
petition for capital. Having argued that capital is good for right-wing 
and left-wing governments, the objectives of each government are to get 
as much capital as possible, i.e. Vjb
1 
> Vjb
2 
if D1 > D2. Then the ideal 
situation for e.g. the domestic country would be one where all the capital 
would be invested at home, w = 1 and w* = 0. 
The objective function also makes it possible for each government 
to pursue its domestically preferred policy, r E [rr, TJ]. This is captured 
by the fact that a right-wing government, (3 = 0, is only concerned about 
the Capitalists' welfare. This is tantamount to choosing taxes in a way 
so as to guarantee high k and k*. 
For the rest of the paper this objective function will be assumed to 
represent the governments' objectives. 
17Note that only the domestic Capitalists' consumption enters this function. This 
is so because a national government usually only represents the interests of its own 
citizens. 
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3.2 Competition for Capital 
In this section we will look for a Nash equilibrium in tax rates and the re-
distribution parameters >., A*. From the assumptions about the game the 
following should be noted: Given the timing of moves and the assumption 
on the information structure the game is reduced to a repeated two-stage 
game. First the public sector moves and then the private sector. For our 
game this means that given the investment decision of the Capitalists, 
i.e. wand (1-w*), the governments decide on the tax rates and redistri-
bution. Given the tax rates and A, A* the private sector decides on where 
to invest. 
Given investment let us note that the growth rate of domestically 
installed capital is given by r = V"fk + v*"fk• where V =: ~; and v* =: 
(l-~;w are the shares of domestic and foreign capital in domestically 
installed capital. 
Solving backwards requires a government to solve (37) taking its 
opponent's choices of ( ti, t2, A*) as given. The solution to this problem 
is presented in Appendix A.2 and leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: For two similar countries there exist nine classes of pure 
strategy Nash Equilibria. The average after-tax returns in both 
countries are equal, i.e. f-f = 1-:.-i* with f = i* and f = r*. The 
investors are indifferent where to go, i.e. w E [0, 1] and w* E [0, 1] 
and never pay more than the average tax rates. No redistribution 
takes place, i.e. A, A* = 0 regardless of political preferences. Capital 
flight may occur if ti, t2 2:: i* or t1. t2 2:: f which happens in two 
classes of pure strategy equilibria. Both countries grow at the same 
rate, r = 'Yk = 'Yk• = r* if no capital flight occurs. 
If Proposition 1 is assumed to hold one can see that the dynamic 
equilibrium is similar to the Closed Economy case. 
Two important features of the Proposition merit attention. First, 
we get equal average tax rates in both countries, but individual tax rates 
such as t 1 , t2 may be different around f. Thus, the strict form of the 
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source principle does not necessarily hold in equilibrium. This is, of 
course, due to the indeterminacy of the w' s. Note also that the taxes 
are non-zero despite the presence of perfect capital mobility. Second, 
left-wing governments will not redistribute in equilibrium. The reason 
for this is that the concern for inequality is competed away by fear of 
capital flight. Capital is good to left-wing governments for redistributive 
reasons and for wages. Facing tax competition the left-wing government 
is better off if it puts more emphasis on securing high wages instead of 
redistribution. This is so even if, as has been assumed in (37), given the 
capital a left-wing government derives more utility than a right-wing one 
with the same capital. Intuitively, it does not pay a left-wing govern-
ment to redistribute in this situation since redistributed capital is not 
productive. To have higher wages intertemporally yields higher utility 
then. Third, perfeCt capital mobility may accidentally lead to capital 
flight in which case one country does not grow at all. This consequence 
cannot be ruled out because of the extreme behaviour we have assumed. 
Therefore, in a situation where both countries are equally efficient 
both governments optimally act as a right-wing government would by 
setting the growth maximizing tax rates. Note also that Proposition 1 
predicts that we will see a very unequal distribution of capital over time. 
Tax competition provides a force that perpetuates this inequality. 
Proposition 2: If two different countries' governments compete for cap-
ital the more efficient country, A > A*, always gets all the capi-
tal, w = 1,w* = 0. The inefficient country, A* < A, chooses 
t~ = t; = i* regardless of political preferences, i.e. (3* = 1, (0). 
The efficient country (A> A*) chooses either 
(1) t1 = tz = f and ..\ = 0 if f3 = 0, or 
(2) t1 = tz = r E (f,f], where f < (r- r*) + i* and..\ 2: 0 if (3 = 1. 
An efficient right-wing country gets the same amount of capital as 
a redistributing efficient left-wing country, i.e. w;, = wilr = 0 and 
w=l. 
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This proposition, which is proved in Appendix A.3, derives an ex-
treme result that follows from the extreme investment behaviour of the 
Capitalists coupled with perfect capital mobility. The model would pre-
dict that redistribution is possible if a country is more efficient than the 
other one. Redistribution then depends on the opponent's technology. 
Also note that an efficient left-wing government will get more capital 
and guarantee a higher after-tax return. Its growth rate will therefore 
also be higher as shown below. If there is an efficiency difference there is 
hence a possibility for a left-wing government to pursue a policy which 
will have higher growth than its opponent and redistribution. The redis-
tributive freedom is limited by the efficiency difference. For an inefficient 
left-wing government redistribution is always suboptimal. 
We will now look at the dynamic equilibrium of the domestic econ-
omy under Proposition 2. From (14} and (19} we get /c = /k· The same 
holds for the foreign Capitalists. In the two-country world the resource 
constraint for the domestic country is given by 
I= j( = (r- T)[wk + (1- w*)k*]- cK . (39) 
where it is important to note that CK -:j:. Ck, C1( is the aggregate con-
sumption of the domestic and foreign Capitalists consuming the domestic 
output and we have used the binding constraint, cw = [1J+AT]K. Given 
the constancy of the after-tax return, dividing (39) by K, taking loga-
rithms and time derivatives yields i( I J( = 6 I C. From the production 
function we get k I J( = Y jY by a similar procedure. One may then 
verify that the aggregate growth rate on a balanced growth path is given 
by 
(40) 
This completely characterizes the dynamic equilibrium for the efficient 
economy. The inefficient economy gets no capital, w* = 0, w = 1, and so 
does not grow at all. Hence for A > A* we have r > r* = 0. 
Recall that for two equally efficient countries, the left-wing country 
will grow less than the right-wing one, cf. Proposition 1. It is interesting 
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to note, however, that an efficient left-wing country is better off in a 
world with perfect capital mobility than in a world where investors face 
transaction or installation costs. With imperfect capital mobility it is 
shown in Rehme {1994b) that an efficient left-wing country gets more 
but not all capital. 
From this it is clear that an efficient redistributing government 
pays redistribution by an efficiency difference vis-a-vis its opponent. If 
this difference is small, redistribution will be small as well. Should one 
observe redistribution, though, the inequality in the capital distribution 
will decrease over time. Thus, inequality reducing policies are ultimately 
made possible by aggregate efficiency differences. 
Finally, let us note that the equilibria of Propositions 1 and 2 are 
all Pareto-efficient.18 To see this note that if we took only a tiny amount 
of capital away from the capital possessing country it would be worse off 
which violates the Pareto Principle. 
4 Conclusion 
Employing the framework of a simple endogenous growth model with 
distributional conflicts seems to imply that if one taxes wealth, the growth 
rate is reduced by redistribution. This is the argun1ent presented e.g. in 
Alesina and Rodrik {1994) and Bertola {1993) and would suggest that 
redistribution always implies lower growth. 
If one extends the growth redistribution trade-off problem to a 
a two-country world with perfect capital mobility, extreme investment 
behaviour and introduces non-cooperative behaviour, by which govern-
ments compete in wealth tax rates using the source principle, the pos-
sibility of capital flight features saliently in the optimal decisions of a 
government that wishes to redistribute. 
18This provides an exan1ple for a recent result stated in Janeba and Peters (1994) 
who have shown that in a gan1e where the payoff functions have discontinuities and 
Nash Equilibria exist, they will be Pareto-efficient. 
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It has been shown that in a situation where the opponent is equally 
efficient, i.e. the countries are technologically similar, no redistribution 
will take place in the optimum. This holds even when the two opponents 
both care about redistribution. The intuitive reason for this is that given 
the technology capital is good for right-wing and left-wing governments. 
It has been argued that capital flight reduces wages and the utility loss of 
a government incurred by a drop in wages absolutely outweighs the utility 
gain derived from redistribution, which is not productive. In terms of the 
distribution of capital we will observe an unequal distribution over time. 
But the workers are compensated for this by higher wages. This result 
provides a benchmark for the case where countries are technologically 
different. 
If the countries are technologically different, i.e. one country is 
more efficient than another one, then more capital will locate in the 
efficient country. If the efficient country wishes to redistribute, it can 
'afford' to do so without loosing any capital. This is in contrast to Rehme 
(1994b) where investors operate in a world of imperfect capital mobility. 
The amount of redistribution depends on who the opponent is and in 
particular on the efficiency gap that distinguishes it from its opponents. 
From this it follows that policies that are geared to make an econ-
omy more efficient are in the interest of both workers and capital owners. 
Redistribution does not necessarily cause slower growth in comparison to 
other countries if the countries are competing for capital and the country 
in question is technologically more efficient. But then it appears that the 
true trade-off is between policies that guarantee a high capital stock and 
an efficient technology. With a large enough efficiency gap redistribution 
is then a matter of political leanings. 
Several caveats apply. We have only considered wealth taxes as 
a tax base. Other tax base choices may change the results in a two-
country world considerably. [Cf. Rehme (1994a)] We have abstracted 
from questions .of time inconsistency. If countries could remember the 
whole history of the game the outcome might well be different. We have 
not analyzed the role of tariffs and capital flight. It is quite likely that 
a country that experiences capital outflows or capital flight will set up 
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tariffs. It would also be desirable to use a less aggregated set-up when 
investigating the trade-off problem. In reality workers own capital and 
some well capital endowed persons enter employment. 
These and other problems provide room for further extensions of 
this model and for more research on the so-called trade-off between 
growth and redistribution. 
A Appendix 
A.l The indirect utility function 
From the optimal decision of the Capitalists and in particular from (14), 
(19) we get that in steady state Ck = pk. This is clearly increasing ink. 
If one maximizes this subject to e.g. k = 72k we know that 1 is concave 
in T and the derivatives ofT w.r.t. t1o t 2 exist. Hence, the restriction on 
vr. So any function that is increasing in Ck such as vr(Ck) represents 
Capitalists' welfare. 
The Workers just consume their wage income plus transfers. This 
is given by (20). Rearranging (5) yields T = K(~-.x)· We can then express 
the Workers' consumption as 
(G)l-cr ). cw = (1- a)A J( K + G 1 _ >.. (41) 
The first expression on the RHS corresponds to the wages and they 
are given by ryK = (1 a )AG1-"' J("'. This expression is increasing in 
k, k*. As to the second expression. G is clearly increasing ink, k* as well. 
A left-wing government wishes to redistribute. Only the second 
expression involves >.. Changes of cw w.r.t. positive changes in >. are 
given (l!W , which is positive. 
Hence, any utility function V 1 that is increasing in cw satisfies (a). 
The condition of changes in T on the properties of Vi follow from 
the fact that maximization should be carried out subject to the growth 
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rate. This provides the justification for the restrictions on Vj as given in 
( 38). Hence, Vi ( ·) may capture the properties of the respective indirect 
utility functions. 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1 
Let q indicate a contradiction. We will prove the proposition in three 
steps. The first step only considers right-wing governments (.A = .A* = 
0) and shows that in a proposed Nash Equilibrium one government can 
improve upon the proposed equilibrium by a small change in one of the 
tax rates so that the proposed Nash Equilibrium could not have been a 
Nash Equilibrium. This eliminates impossible classes of Nash Equilibria. 
In a second step it will be proven that the remaining possible classes of 
Nash Equilibria are indeed Nash Equilibria. In the third step it is shown 
that left-wing governments will optimally not redistribute. 
Recall the governments' objective functions are continuous in the tax 
rates and increasing in (k, k*), given w and w*. 
Note that in the case of equal after-ta.x returns on capital w is a corre-
spondence. For r- t 1 = r*- t2 we see that wE [0, 1]. Thus, w can take 
any value in the closed interval [0, 1]. For unequal after-tax returns this 
indeterminacy is resolved. For what is to follow we take the values of 
w, w* as given from the second stage of the game and do a comparative 
static exercise. 
Step 1 
Claim 1: 
The following characterizes one possible class of Nash Equilibria. 
1. wE(0,1)/\w*E(0,1) and i2=ti=i*=f=tl=t2 
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Proof: 
In this (w, w*) combination it cannot be that e.g. t1 > t2 • Suppose the 
inequality holds. Then we must have that t~ > tr. Note it is true at 
wE (0, 1) 1\ w* E (0, 1) that 
(A) : r - t 1 = r* - t; 1\ (B) : r - t2 = r* - t~ ( 42) 
If t1 =/= t 2 then the following cases are possible. 
a. t1 > f > t2 b. t2 > f > t1 c. t1 > t2 > f 
d. t2 > t 1 > f e. t 1 < t2 < f f. t2 < t1 < f 
Let us note that 
(C) : o:At1-"'- t > o:At*1-"' t* 1 1 - 2 2 
or 
(D) : o:At~-"'- t1 < o:At~1-"'- t~ 
(43) 
This is always true. We may note that if 1 w* = 0 and w > 0 then 
r = o:Ati-"'. Assume that (C) holds then the domestic government can 
improve on its outcome in the proposed Nash Equilibrium and if (D) 
holds the foreign government can improve by a similar argument. 
I will now show that given e.g. t 1 > t2 the home country can get more 
capital by tiny changes in the tax rates t1 or t2 • Thus, we concentrate on 
cases a., c. and f .. For the moment assume that a. so that t1 > f > t2 • 
We know that t1 > t2 entails t; > tr at (A) and (B). The domestic 
country can do two things. It can either cut t 1 by a tiny amount E, then 
the new tax rate is t'1 = t 1 - E, or it can raise t2 by a tiny amount and 
we get ~ = t2 + E. From now on all changes induced by tiny changes in 
the tax rates will be denoted by a ('). Thus, we have that e.g. t'1 ::; t1 , 
but it is still assumed true that ~ > t2 1\ t; > ti. 
Consider the case of a tax cut in t1 • Then it is always true that 
t'1) - (r t1) - [(r' - t2) 
(r*' - t;) - (r* t;)- [(r*' 
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(r - t2)] = t'1 - t1 = E > 0 
tr)- (r* tr)J = o. 
(44) 
(45) 
Using (A) and (B) these two expressions imply 
(r1 - t~)- (r*' - t;) > (r1 - t2) (r*' - t'D (46) 
This is equivalent to 
or 
(r1 - t2 ) < (r*'- ti) {:} w* = 1 
Thus either w1 = 1 or w*' = 1. Assume w*' = 1. Recall that we did not 
change t1 , ti, t2 and that for the case t'1 > t2 and t2 > ti the following 
derivatives apply for changes in the capital stock as can be verified from 
(10) and (11) in the text 
r~ > 0, (47) 
If w*' = 1 then 1 - w*' = 0. If E is sufficiently small, i.e. E -+ 0, then 
So for w*' = 1 > 0 and t2 > ti, no matter how small E is, we must have 
that r*' < aA(t2)1-". This follows from (47). So 
r*'- t; < aA(t;)1-" t;:::; aA(t~?-<>- t'1 ~ aA(tl)l-a- t1 (49) 
So w*' = 1 :=} d = 1. Thus, it must be that d = 1. If w*' 2:: w* then 
r 1 > r and r*' < r*. But then rt.- t2 > r*' t;' so Q. So we have w*' < w*. 
Then d = 1 > w and w*' < w*: means that the domestic government is 
definitely better off since it gets· more capital. 
It is easy to verify that the same result can be obtained by an €-increase 
in t2 • Note that if (C) does not hold, then (D) holds and the foreign 
government can also get more capital by either a tiny cut in t2 or an 
increase in t;'. For instance, ifcan be shown that, if aA(tr)1-<>- t 1 < 
aA(t2)1-<> -t2, the foreign country can do better by cutting t2 by a small 
amount. 
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This means that the proposed class of Nash Equilibria is not a class of 
Nash Equilibria with t 1 > f > t2 so we must have t 1 ::; f ::; t2 and 
aA(t1)1-"'- t1 ::; aA(t2)1-"'- t;. 
Now assume b., i.e. t2 > f > t 1 and correspondingly t! > ti and again 
assume aA(t1)1-"'- t1 ::; aA(t2)1-"'- t;. 
Then a tiny tax cut in t2 or a small increase in t 1 leads to either w = 0 
or w* = 0. Going through sinillar arguments as before shows that the 
domestic country can get more capital than before by one of the changes 
mentioned. Analogous arguments hold for the foreign government. Thus, 
b. does not characterize a possible class of Nash Equilibria. 
Hence, we must have t1 t2 = ti = t;. Also t1 = t2 = f = i* = t! = t2 
must hold. 
Suppose not and that t 1 = t2 # f. As the technologies of the two 
countries are the same we have f = i*. If t 1 = t2 > f then the foreign 
government can move t! = ti closer to f and get all the capital. This 
rules out all the other cases, i.e. c. - f. 
Therefore, t 1 = t2 = t! = ti = f = i* and w E (0, 1) and w* E (0, 1) 
characterizes a possible class of Nash Equilibria. 
Claim 2: 
All the following are also possible classes of Nash Equilibria 
2. w=1/\w*E(0,1), and t*>t*-t -t -i*-f 2-1-1-2-
3. w = 0 1\ w* E (0, 1), and t >t -t*-t*-i*-f 1_2_1_2_
4. wE (0, 1) 1\ w* = 1, and t >t -t*-t*-i*-f 2_1_1_2_
5. wE (0, 1) 1\ w* = 0, and t*>t*-t -t -i*-f 1-2-1-2-
6. w = 1/\ w* 1 and ti 2 ti = i* = f = t1 ::; t2 
7. w = 0 1\ w* = 0 and t! 2 t2 = i* = f = t2 ::; t1 
8. w = 1/\ w* = 0 and t2 = tl = i* = f ::; ti' t2 
9. w = 0 1\ w* = 1 and ti = ti = i* = f ::; t1' t2 
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Proof: 
Suppose e.g. 2 .. so that w = 1 and w* E (0, 1). Also assume that a. so 
that t1 > f > t2 • Then all the arguments of Claim 1 hold. Thus, we 
must at least have t1 = t2 = f = tr ::; t;. But due to the the Reaction 
Functions of the Private Sector we cannot exclude the possibility of w = 1 
at t1 = t2 = f = tr ::; t;. Thus, for the proposed ~quilibrium to be Nash 
Equilibrium we must have t; 2: i*. 
Hence, for the proposed Nash Equilibrium to be a Nash Equilibrium we 
have that t1 = t2 = tj = f and i2 2: i* for w = 1 and w* E (0, 1). 
It can be verified that analogous reasoning holds in all the other cases. 
Step 2 
We now turn to the question of existence. It is easy to verify that all 
the possible classes of Nash Equilibria can be summarized by a situation 
where all the tax rates are equal to f. To this end we consider a situation 
where 
t1 = t2 = f = i* = t~ = t; and wE (0, 1] 1\ w* E (0, 1] 
Now, suppose without loss of generality that we cut t1 by a small amount 
at t1 = t2 = tr = t; = f = i* and wE (0, 1) and w* E (0, 1), then 
1 
" "* A"l-a · th i i* i* " r < r = r = a T g1ven at 2 = 1 = 2 = T 
So w*' -+ 1. Then r' - ~ < r* - i*. because t!1 < f = t2 and then w*' = 1. 
But then w -+ 0 and the domestic country gets worse off. 
Suppose we raise t1 by a small amount. Then for any w*' 
r'- t~ < aAf1-"'- f = r* 
So the domestic capital definitely leaves, w = 0. Then 
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Now the foreign capital is indifferent where to go. We can reasonably 
assume then w*' 2::: w*. So again the domestic country is worse off. 
Suppose f1 > t1 and~ > t2. Now if f1 2::: f2 then r1 - f1 < o!Af1-"'- f = 
r*'- t;. So w = 0. Then r1 - ~ < aAf1-"'- f = r*' - t! and w*' = 1. So 
this is bad for the domestic government. Similarly, ~ ~ ~ induces loss 
of capital. 
Now suppose t 1 < f and t2 > f. Then for all w1 and w*' we have 
I (.tl .t1 I *') (.tl .t1 I *') s I .t1 *' * d *' 1 r = r L1 , L2 , w , w ~ r L2 , L2 , w , w . o r - L2 < r t 1 an w = . 
If w*' = 1 then r1 - ~ < aAf1-"'- f = r*' t2. Sow= 0 and therefore 
bad for the domestic country. 
Similar arguments hold for changes of the foreign country's tax rates. 
Hence, each deviation from t1 = t2 = ti = t2 = f = r* makes the 
country that deviates worse off. By similar arguments all the proposed 
classes of Nash Equilibria are Nash Equilibria. 
Step 3 
From Step 1 and 2 we know that that f = i*. If A 2::: 0 then r I f. 
First suppose the other government is right-wing. Then it can find a 
t!, t2 combination so that it gets all the capital. But then from (38) we 
have VjLo = 0 < Vj\=o so that II1 is worse off. The opposite holds for 
the foreign country if it sets A* 2::: 0. 
Now suppose both countries are left-wing. As the capital may bang from 
one country to the other lowering A is good for either government. 
If a government sets f I f then the other country gets all the capital. 
Hence, each left-wing government will set A= A*= 0, f = f and i* = i*. 
Finally, from (19) it follows that r = 'Yk = "/k• = r* except for the classes 
8. and 9.. D 
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A·.3 Proof of Proposition 2 
Let the home country be more efficient, A > A*. I will now show that 
the maximum after-tax return in the efficient country is higher than in 
the inefficient one. Assume that >. = 0. Recall the expressions for f and 
r. 
r = [a(1- a)Apia (50) 
We want to show that f - r > r* - r*. To this end let us assume that 
A = xA*, where x > 1. If we make the appropriate substitutions we 
obtain 
X~ (1;',. T*) > (1:-,.- T*) 
X~ > 1 
(51a) 
(51b) 
If X > 1, then f- f > r*- i*. We will express this fact in a little Lemma. 
Lemma 1: If A> A*, then r- r.> r*- r*. 
If A= xA*,x > 1 it is easy to verify that f > r* and f > i*. We make 
this 
Lemma 2: If A> A* then f > r* and f > r*. 
Equipped with these two Lemmas the proof proceeds as in Appendix A.2 
as regards the choice of t 1 , t2 , ti, t;. Then we have to distinguish these 
cases 
1. rr*: IF will set T = f and IF* chooses i*. But then you inlm.ediately 
get w = 1, w* = 0 by LeiD.Iiia ·1. 
2. rl*: IF sets T = f and then you get the same outcome as in 1. 
3. Zr*: TI1 chooses T E [f,f] and nr* sets r* = i*. So by (38) TI1 
will set T such that r - T > r* - T* SO that it gets all the capital. 
Since V.b > > V.[j. ::::; 0 and V1 ~ 0, TI1 may set T so that r - f = 
r* - r* + € > r* - i* with >. ~ 0 and € small. 
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4. ll*: II1 : r E [f,f] and II1* : r* E [r*, i*]. From above we know that 
II1 must set r*, but then we get the same result as in 3. 
Since f ::; f and f > f we must have w~1 = W~r = 0 from the private 
sector's reaction and Lemmas 1 and 2, equation (18), and sow = 1 for 
all IIi. o 
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